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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue in this case is whether Appellants, Eric R. Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC
(collectively "Clark"), may bring an action: (1) to enforce an attorney lien under Idaho Code
§ 3-205 against Clark's opposing counsel, Respondents Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,

William Fuhrman and Christopher Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill"), although Jones
Gledhill never actually possessed the funds to which Clark claims he is entitled; or (2) for
negligence because of Jones Gledhill's purported "failure to protect" Clark's alleged interest in
his former clients' settlement funds.

I. Factual Background
Clark, an attorney, represented Travis Forbush, Gretchen Hymas and Breanna Halowell
(collectively "Clients"), in a wrongful death and personal injury action, entitled Forbush v.

Sagecrest Multi-Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Ada County Case No. CV PI 1304325
("underlying action"). 1 (R. 19 at ,r 17.) Clark filed that underlying action against Anfinson
Plumbing, LLC ("Anfinson"), among other defendants. (R. 17 at ,r 5.) Jones Gledhill
represented Anfinson in the underlying action.
Eventually, Spence appeared in the underlying action on behalf of the Clients and cocounseled with Clark against Anfinson. (R. 19 at ,r 18.) In August 2015, Clark withdrew from
representation. (R. 19-20 at ,r,r 19-20; see also Appellants' Brief at p. 3.) After his withdrawal,
Clark sent Jones Gledhill a letter in September 2015, stating he was "asserting an attorney lien

A portion of this underying action currently remains pending before this Court. Forbush, et al.
v. Sagecrest Multi-Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Supreme Court No. 44053 (filed March 21,
2016.)
1

1

according to LC. § 3-205" and requesting Jones Gledhill to "include [his] name on any
settlements checks." (R. 15.)2 Clark, however, never filed and served a notice of an attorney
lien in the underlying action.
Several months later, Anfinson settled the Clients' claims for policy limits of $1,000,000.
The trial date was impending, and to obtain a dismissal for Anfinson, Jones Gledhill conveyed a
check from Anfinson's insurer to Spence per the parties agreed upon settlement. Because Clark
had withdrawn from the Clients' representation, Jones Gledhill did not communicate with Clark
regarding Anfinson' s settlement.
In February, Clark threatened to sue Jones Gledhill for its purported "failure to protect
settlement funds" for him. (See R. 9.) Clark sent Jones Gledhill a draft complaint alleging that
Jones Gledhill "owed Clark a duty to protect his lien" by including Clark as a payee on the
settlement check and that Jones Gledhill breached this duty by delivering the check to Spence
without Clark's name on it. (See R. 13 at ,r,r 25-27.) Notably, however, Jones Gledhill had no
personal knowledge of Clark's purported entitlement to any of his former Clients' settlement
funds.
Obviously, as Clark's opponent, Jones Gledhill had no means by which to resolve Clark's
dispute with his former Clients. Jones Gledhill did not know the terms of any fee agreement
between Clark and his former Clients or between Clark and his former co-counsel, Spence. It
did not know the nature of any dispute between Clark, the former Clients and Spence. It was not

Clark's Amended Complaint references this letter as an exhibit, but fails to attach it. (See R. 20
at ,r 20.) It is attached, however, to Clark's original complaint. (R. 15.)
2
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privy to the reasons for Clark's withdrawal. It did not know whether that withdrawal was
voluntary or at the former Clients' requests. 3 It did not know whether Clark's termination was
for cause or without cause. It did not know whether the Clients had any claims against Clark,
which might offset his fees. And, it did not know whether Clark's claim for fees against his
Clients or Spence had already been satisfied.
Further, Jones Gledhill's legal research showed Clark had no viable claim against Jones
Gledhill. In response to Clark's threat to sue, Jones Gledhill sent Clark a letter citing legal
authority that§ 3-205 did not provide for an attorney lien against an attorney's opponent.
(R. 131-32.) Specifically, Jones Gledhill cited Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 928
(1983), which provides:
[The attorney] asserts he may claim any sum in fees without the necessity of
proving the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process and that he
may then levy against the property of the opposing party, who is a total stranger to
the contract under which [the attorney] claims money. We decline to so interpret
the attorney's charging lien ....
Id at 465, 660 P.2d at 930 (emphasis added). Jones Gledhill also cited In re Goldberg, 235 B.R.

476 (D. Idaho 1999), which relied upon Frazee to conclude that "[t]he plain language of[§ 3205] allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer against the lawyer's own client. There is nothing
in§ 3-205 or case law that authorizes an attorneys' lien in favor of an opponent's lawyer." Id
at 484 (emphasis added).

Clark alleges in this case that "due to [Spence's] malpractice and incompetence, Clark
withdrew from the case." (R. 19 at 119.) Jones Gledhill, however, has since learned that Clark
actually withdrew from the case because the Clients terminated his representation. (See, e.g.,
R. 279.)
3

3

II. Procedural Background

Ignoring this authority, Clark sued Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016. (R. 8-15.)
Thereafter, Clark amended his complaint to increase his purported damages from $140,000 to
$500,000. (Compare R. 13 at 128 with R. 21 at 128.) The exact nature of Clark's claim against
Jones Gledhill is somewhat unclear. Although Clark alleges his case is "an attorney lien case,"
his allegations suggest he is attempting to sue Jones Gledhill in negligence for breach of a
purported "duty to protect Clark's lien." (Compare R. 17 at 11 with R. 21 at 1125-28.)
Jones Gledhill moved to dismiss Clark's action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim, and it construed Clark's complaint broadly as
asserting both an action to enforce an attorney lien and a negligence claim. In support of its
motion to dismiss, Jones Gledhill argued that: ( 1) it did not owe Clark a duty of reasonable care
to protect his attorney lien, (R. 31-32); (2) regardless, the litigation privilege barred Clark's
action because Jones Gledhill was acting on behalf of its client, Anfinson, when settling the
claims against it, (R. 27-28); and (3) § 3-205 did not authorize a lien against Jones Gledhill,
Clark's opponent. (R. 29-31.)
In opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion, Clark filed numerous documents outside the
pleadings, including documents containing his former Clients' attorney-client privileged
communications and protected work product. (See, e.g., R. 236-48, R. 250-54, R. 266.) Jones
Gledhill moved to strike all of Clark's submissions under Rule 12 because they were outside the
pleadings and unnecessary for resolving Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Idaho
R. Civ. P. 12(d) (matters outside the pleadings but not excluded require motion to be treated as

4

summary judgment motion); see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(f) ("The court may strike ... any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."). Meanwhile, Clark's former Clients
specially appeared per Rule 32 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules to request that a subset
of Clark's submissions outside the pleadings-i. e., their attorney-client communications and
work product-be sealed from public disclosure. (R. 356-65.)
At the conclusion of the hearing on Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and other
pending motions, the district court stated that it intended, among other things, to grant Jones
Gledhill's motion to dismiss and that it would prepare a written order. (R. 144-45, pp 33:1734:16.) Before that written order was entered, however, Clark moved for reconsideration and
also to amend his complaint to add new defendants, including Anfinson and its insurer. (See
R. 61-63, R. 305-17, R. 318-25, R. 326-52.)
Before Jones Gledhill responded to Clarks' new motions, the district court entered its
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint. (R. 74-76.) At the
same time, the district court also entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion
to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice
("Memorandum Decision"). (R. 64-73.) In its Memorandum Decision, the district court
dismissed Clark's complaint, correctly concluding that Clark could prove no set of facts in
support of a claim that would entitle him to relief against Jones Gledhill. (R. 72.)
In support of this conclusion, the district court ruled that Jones Gledhill "owed no
contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect his interests." (Id) Further, it ruled that Clark
could not assert an unperfected lien (i.e., one that had not already been reduced to an enforceable
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sum certain) against Jones Gledhill. (See R. 71.) Specifically, it ruled that "[w]ithout
affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his lien by 'reducing it to a judgment or order of the
court,' no authority exists to pay Clark any amount of money on behalf of his former Clients."
(Id.) The district court also noted that even if Clark eventually did perfect his lien, he could

never enforce it against Jones Gledhill because Jones Gledhill no longer possessed the settlement
check or proceeds. (R. 72.) Finally, the district court denied Clark's motions for reconsideration
and to amend his complaint concluding that Clark's "filings do not add any new facts or
authorities that bear on the correctness of the judgment of the court." (R. 75.)
Subsequently, the district court awarded Jones Gledhill $26,250 in attorney fees under
Idaho Code§ 12-121, concluding Clark "brought and pursued this case frivolously, umeasonably
and without foundation .... " (R. 213.) In support of this conclusion, the district court found that
Clark (1) had disregarded established case law; (2) did not argue a new or novel interpretation of
§ 3-205, but rather argued that the district court should reject established case law; and (3) had

been specifically warned by Jones Gledhill before filing the action that it was barred by
established case law. (R. 212-13.) Further, the district court noted that Clark unnecessarily
increased the cost of litigation by filing confidential documents in the record that had no bearing
on Clark's case. (R. 213.)
Clark appeals the district court's award of fees, the dismissal of Clark's action, and the
sealing of his former Clients' confidential information. In support of his appeal, Clark attempts
to "incorporate" the "facts" in his opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss and in his
allegations in another complaint, an action against his former Clients, Clark v. Forbush, Ada
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County Case No. CV-OC-1604217 ("ClarR'). 4 An overwhelming majority of these purported
"facts," however, are irrelevant to this appeal, including Clark's self-serving descriptions of
events in the underlying action and of his disagreements with his former Clients' and cocounsel's decisions in that action.
One collateral fact is important to note, however: One week before Clark sued Jones
Gledhill on March 10, 2016, he filed the Clark action against his former Clients on March 3.

(See R. 329-52.) Among other things, Clark alleges in Clark that his former Clients breached
their fee agreements with him and that they tortiously interfered with Clark's fee-split agreement
with Spence. (See R. 336 at ,r,r 41-44; R. 338-39,

,r,r 62-66.)

Further, he alleges in Clark that he

is owed fees in various different amounts, including $40,000, (R. 338 at ,r 55); $140,000, (R. 339
at ,r 66); $500,000, (R. 336 at ,r 44; R. 338 at ,r 61) and an indeterminate amount into the future.
(R. 337 at ,r 50.) Jones Gledhill also understands that Clark subsequently amended his complaint
in Clark to assert claims against Spence. (See Appellants' Brief at 3 (stating Clark has sued his
former co-counsel for fees).) Clark's allegations in Clark highlight that even Clark cannot
definitively state whether his former Clients or Spence or both owe him fees and in what
amount-the very concern which prompted the district court to conclude in this case that Clark
had to perfect his lien.

Clark filed Clark in the wrong venue, and the district court has since transferred it to Canyon
County, Case No. CV-2016-06347.

4
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
In Clark's "Issues Presented on Appeal," Clark challenges the district court's dismissal of
his complaint, its award of attorney fees to Jones Gledhill and its decision to seal certain records.
Clark does not list the district court's denial of his motion to amend as an issue for appeal.
(Appellants' Brief at 4 (listing issues). But, Clark appears to challenge that decision. (Id. at 11
("The District Court also erred when it denied Clark's Motion to Amend.") Jones Gledhill,
therefore, addresses whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Clark's
motion to amend.

ARGUMENT
I. The District Court's Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6) Was Proper.

This district court properly dismissed Clark's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. Under Frazee, Clark's claim fails because he did not perfect his lien before
attempting to enforce it against Jones Gledhill. Furthermore, Clark fails to meet the five
requirements for enforcing an attorney lien set forth in Skelton v. Spencer, l 02 Idaho 69, 625
P.2d 1072 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Kinghorn v. Clay, 153 Idaho 462,467,283
P.3d 779, 784 (2012). To the extent Clark's claim is an attempt to allege negligence, it fails
because Jones Gledhill had no legal duty to include Clark's name as a payee on Anfinson's
settlement check or otherwise to protect Clark's interest in his former Clients' settlement funds.
Moreover, the litigation privilege protects Jones Gledhill from liability for acting on Anfinson's
behalf and in its best interests.

8

A. Standard of Review

Clark incorrectly states that the standard of review is for an abuse of discretion.
(Appellants' Brief at 11 ("[T]he District Court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal
standard."); see also id. at 10 (same); id at 13 (same).) A motion to dismiss is proper if"it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief." Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). In reviewing
a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the proper standard requires this Court to view all facts and
inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party to determine whether a claim for
relief has been stated. Coalition/or Agric. Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 142,145,369
P.3d 920, 923 (2016).
B. Clark Cannot Enforce an Attorney Lien Against Jones Gledhill.

Clark failed to state a viable claim to enforce an attorney lien, as the district court
correctly ruled. Clark challenges this ruling by claiming there was a "fund" against which to
assert his lien so the district court incorrectly analyzed his claim under Frazee instead of Skelton.
(Appellants' Brief at 10-11.) Clark's argument is without merit. Regardless of whether Clark's
claim is analyzed under Frazee or Skelton, Clark's claim necessarily fails.
In Skelton, a law firm sought to enforce an attorney lien under§ 3-205 against its former
client, Spencer. 102 Idaho at 70, 625 P.2d at 1073. Spencer had retained the law firm to handle
numerous matters related to her husband's estate. Id. at 70-71, 625 .2d at 1073-74. Spencer
became dissatisfied with the law firm and discharged it. Id. at 71,625 P.2d at 1074.
Subsequently, the law firm filed a "notice of claim of attorney's lien" in three separate cases

9

including case no. 20500, which was an action against Spencer to enforce a settlement agreement
that the law firm had previously negotiated on Spencer's behalf. Id at 71, 625 P.2d at 1074.
Later, the plaintiffs in case no. 20500 deposited with the court a fund of $157,500, which they
owed Spencer under the former settlement. Id at 72, 625 P.2d at 1075. The law firm "filed a
petition in no. 20500 to enforce the lien against the fund." Id. Spencer opposed the petition, but
the court entered findings of fact and conclusions oflaw awarding the law firm a portion of the
funds deposited with the court for Spencer's benefit. Id at 72-73, 625 P.2d at 1075-76.
On appeal, the Court upheld the award to the law firm. It concluded that "[t]he law is
well settled that an attorney in asserting a charging lien is entitled to recover against sums which
his efforts have brought forth." Id. at 75, 625 P.2d at 1078. Further, the Court specifically
concluded that the law firm's efforts created the deposited funds: "The monies paid into court in
case no 20500 were the product of the settlement brought forth by the efforts of [the law firm]."

Id. Finally, the Court concluded that the law firm had met the five requirements necessary for
enforcing a charging lien against its former client, including:
(1) That there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution on
equitable principles, (2) that the services of the attorney operated substantially or
primarily to secure the fund out of which he seeks to be paid, (3) that it was
agreed that counsel look to the fund rather than the client for his compensation,
(4) that the lien claimed is limited to costs, fees or other disbursements incurred in
the litigation by which the fund was raised and (5) that there are equitable
considerations which necessitate the recognition and application of the charging
lien.

10

Id. at 76,625 P.2d at 1079 (citation, quotations and parentheses omitted); see also In re Harris,
258 B.R. 8, 13 (D. Idaho 2000) (identifying Skelton requirements); Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho
270,274, 731 P.2d 813,817 (Ct. App. 1986)(same).
In contrast to Skelton, which affirmed the enforcement of an attorney lien, the Court in
Frazee rejected an attorney's attempt to enforce a lien under§ 3-205. In Frazee, attorney Reeves
represented Elaine Frazee against her husband, Kenneth, in a divorce. 104 Idaho at 464, 660
P.2d at 929. The divorce decree required Kenneth to pay $3,000 in cash to Elaine overtime. Id.
Meanwhile, Reeves had billed Elaine $2,800 in fees for representing her in the divorce, which
fees remained unpaid. Id. After Kenneth had already paid Elaine nearly the entire $3,000,
Reeves filed a notice of attorney lien for $2,800 in the divorce action and sought to foreclose his
lien against Kenneth. Id The court denied Reeves' claim oflien against Kenneth, and Reeves
appealed.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial. In doing so, the Court rejected Reeves' broad
interpretation of§ 3-205:
Reeves asserts that he may claim any sum in fees without the necessity of proving
the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process and that he may then
levy against the property of the opposing party, who is a total stranger to the
contract under which Reeves claims money. We decline to so interpret the
attorney's charging lien statute ....
Id. at 465,660 P.2d at 930; see also In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. at 484 ("The plain language of
[§ 3-205] allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer against the lawyer's own client. There is
nothing in§ 3-205 or case law that authorizes an attorneys' lien in favor of an opponent's
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lawyer. Frazee . .. expressly rejected the attempted assertion of a charging lien 'against the
property of the opposing party."' (emphasis in original)).
In rejecting Reeves' argument, the Court considered "the ethical and policy
considerations" involved in construing an attorney lien statute to allow an attorney to attach
property for "unadjudicated and unliquidated claims." Frazee, 104 Idaho at 465,660 P.2d at
930. It noted that allowing an unperfected attorney lien would in turn allow an attorney to cloud
the title of property "with 'claims of an attorney lien' without resort to any adjudication of such
claims" and thereby create "[t]he potential for economic coercion by the attorneys." Id (citing

Ross v. Scannell, 647 P.2d 1004, 1008-09 (Wash. 1982)).
The Frazee Court also noted that allowing the attachment of an unperfected attorney lien
against Kenneth's property would deny him due process to challenge the amount or propriety of
Reeves' claim for fees. Id at 466, 660 P.2d at 931. See also Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho
644,648,991 P.2d 369,373 (Ct. App. 1998) ("When seeking enforcement of an attorney's lien,
due process must be afforded."). Finally, the Court distinguished Skelton by noting that there
was no "fund" against which to assert a lien because Kenneth had already paid Elaine: "[In

Skelton], a 'fund' was in existence representing the sums that the attorney had obtained for his
client. Here no such 'fund' existed, since the moneys had already been paid to the client." Id
at 466, 660 P .2d at 931 (emphasis added).
1. The District Court Properly Relied Upon Frazee.

Frazee is directly on point. Contrary to Clark's assertion, there is not and never was any
"fund" in Jones Gledhill's possession against which Clark could assert a lien. As Clark

12

expressly acknowledges in his allegations, by the time Clark sued Jones Gledhill, Anfinson had

already sent the settlement check to Spence via Jones Gledhill. (See R. 20 at ,r 21 (alleging
Anfinson sent check to Spence).) Because Anfinson had already paid the Clients before Clark's
lawsuit, there was no "fund" in Jones Gledhill's possession created by Anfinson's oavment
-

..

..L

.,,

against which Clark could enforce a lien. See id (concluding no fund exists if "the moneys had
already been paid to the client"). As the district court correctly ruled, the settlement check had
"already gone through the hands of [Jones Gledhill], never to return." (R. 72.)
Moreover, there was no "fund" in this case because, as Clark concedes in his allegations,
what Jones Gledhill received from Anfinson and conveyed to Spence was merely a check-not
actual "proceeds." A check is a type of negotiable instrument. Idaho Code § 28-3-104(6). A
negotiable instrument is not property, but rather a promise or order to pay: '" [N]egotiable
instrument' means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money .... "
Idaho Code§ 28-3-104(1). "A lien is an encumbrance on property." Liberty Mortgage Corp. v.

Fiscus, 379 P.3d 278,285 (Colo. 2016) (concurrence) (emphasis added). A lien cannot
encumber a check because it is not "property." Accordingly, that Jones Gledhill conveyed a
check does not mean, as Clark contends, that Jones Gledhill possessed property against which
Clark could assert a lien.
Even if a check were "property," Jones Gledhill would be deprived due process if Clark
were allowed to proceed against it, just as in Frazee. Jones Gledhill is a complete stranger to
Clark's relationship with his Clients and Spence. Indeed, the preservation of the Clients'
attorney-client privilege and work product necessitates that Jones Gledhill-which is adverse to
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Clark, the Clients and Spence-remain unaware of the specifics of their relationship. As a result,
Jones Gledhill has no meaningful opportunity to determine whether the Clients or Spence owe
Clark anything. That Jones Gledhill knew Clark had previously represented the Clients and had
asserted a lien several months before Anfinson's settlement is entirely inadequate to conclude, as
Clark does, that Jones Gledhill was privy to all the information necessary to challenge Clark's
claim as due process requires. (See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 9 (arguing "Jones Gledhill knew
Clark had been Plaintiffs' counsel for several years, knew that Clark was claiming a lien, and
knew there was a settlement").)
For example, Jones Gledhill has no personal knowledge of: (1) the terms of Clark's fee
agreements with his Clients or Spence; (2) the number of hours Clark spent working on the
underlying case; (3) the value, if any, he added to that case; (4) the amount of costs Clark paid
for the underlying case; (5) whether Clark was terminated for cause; and (6) whether the Clients
or Spence had any viable claims against Clark. These facts, which are unknown to Jones
Gledhill, impact Clark's right to fees. Because Jones Gledhill is not privy to that information, it
has no meaningful opportunity to challenge Clark's claim for fees. Rather, Clark is required to
"take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process [other than an action against Jones Gledhill] to
perfect and reduce his lien to ajudgment or order of the court." See Frazee, 104 Idaho at 466,
660 P.2d at 931.
The district court correctly relied upon Frazee to reach this conclusion when dismissing
Clark's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 70-71.) Clark's action againstJones Gledhill is
simply an attempt to recover his fees (and perhaps more) "without the necessity of proving the
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reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process" and to "levy against the property of
[Jones Gledhill], who is a total stranger to the contract under which [Clark] claims money." Id.
at 465, 660 P.2d at 930. This attempt is precisely the one this Court rejected in Frazee. Id. ("We
decline to so interpret the attorney's charging lien statute .... ").
2. Clark Cannot Meet the Requirements in Skelton.

Challenging the district court's reliance on Frazee, Clark asserts that the Skelton analysis
is the proper analysis in this case. While Clark relies upon Skelton, he ignores entirely the five
requirements set forth in that case for enforcing an attorney lien. See Skelton, l 02 Idaho at 76,
625 P.2d at 1079 (identifying requirements). Clark did not allege any of the Skelton
requirements, and he makes no effort on appeal to argue that he has met them. (See R. 16-23;
see also Appellants' Brief 9-13.) Regardless, Clark can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim that would entitle him to relief.
Clark cannot meet any of the Skelton requirements. The first Skelton requirement is that
"there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution." Id. As discussed above, there is
no "fund" in this case because Jones Gledhill only received a check-not actual proceeds-from
Anfinson; that check had already been sent to Spence when Clark sued Jones Gledhill; and none
of the Anfinson settlement proceeds are ever going to return to Jones Gledhill, as the district
court correctly noted. (See infra at pp. 15-16.)
Even assuming there were an actual fund under Jones Gledhill's control, Clark still fails
to meet the other four remaining Skelton requirements to enforce a lien. Clark has certainly not
"agreed that [he will] look to the fund rather than the client[s] for his compensation." Id.
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Indeed, Clark sued his Clients for the very same damages he seeks against Jones Gledhill-one
week before suing Jones Gledhill. (Compare R. 8-15 (filed March 10, 2016) with R. 329-52
(filed March 3, 2016).) Having sued his Clients for the same fees for which he is suing Jones
Gledhill, Clark cannot credibly assert he has agreed to look only to the purported "fund" he
contends Jones Gledhill has.
Likewise, Clark cannot credibly claim his lien "is limited to costs, fees or other
disbursements incurred in the litigation by which the fund was raised." Id. Notably, Clark failed
to allege an exact amount of fees he is owed or the terms of any agreement under which such
amount could be determined. Rather, Clark has alleged "damages of at least $500,000" and also
damages for his "time and costs expended in recovering his attorney fees from [Spence and the
Clients in Clark] in an amount to be proven at trial." (R. 21 at ,r,r 28-29.)
Clark's damage allegation of $500,000 greatly exceeds any amount to which Clark could
possibly be entitled from the $1,000,000 Anfinson settlement-a fact that Jones Gledhill has
learned as a result of Clark's extraneous submissions in this case. According to Clark's fee
agreements with his Clients, Clark has a 33.3 percent contingency on the Clients' net recovery.
(R. 343-52.) In contrast, Clark's communications with Spence indicate Clark is entitled to a
different amount under a fee-split arrangement, i.e., 35 percent of a 40 percent contingency or a
14 percent contingency on the Clients' recovery. (R. 237-39.) Regardless of which terms apply,
Clark's portion of the Anfinson settlement is nowhere near the $500,000 in damages he claims
against Jones Gledhill. Furthermore, Clark's allegation that he is entitled to damages for
pursuing his claims in Clark also shows that Clark is not limiting his claim against Jones Gledhill
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to the fees he alleges he earned in the underlying action. (R. 21 at, 29 ("Defendants are
required to compensate Clark for Clark's time and costs expended in recovery his fees from
[Spence] and/or [the Clients].").)
Clark also cannot show his services "operated substantially or primarily to secure the
fund out of which he seeks to be paid." Id The Clients terminated Clark on August 26, 2015,

(R. 279), but they did not settle their claims against Anfinson until several months later. (R. 20
at, 21.) Given this time lapse, Clark is incorrect to assert that his efforts "substantially or
primarily" resulted in a settlement occurring many months after his withdrawal. Id Moreover,
Jones Gledhill, not Clark, was privy to certain legal services on behalf of the Clients that
occurred after Clark's termination and that gave rise to Anfinson's settlement, and it personally
knows that Clark did not participate in those efforts.
Finally, there are no equitable considerations necessitating enforcement of a lien against
Jones Gledhill. That Clark worked on the underlying action and was discharged before the
Anfinson settlement is inadequate to establish an equitable reason to allow Clark to pursue his
opponent, Jones Gledhill, for fees that his former Clients or co-counsel purportedly owe him.

3. The District Court Did Not Misconstrue§ 3-205.
Clark misperceives the issue in this case as one of "statutory interpretation" and attempts
to read much more into § 3-205 than its plain language provides. The plain language of the
statute provides only for the attachment of a lien to proceeds-and nothing more: "[T]he
attorney ... has a lien ... which attaches to ... proceeds ... in whosoever hands they may
come." Idaho Code§ 3-205 (emphasis added). It does not provide the means by which Clark
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must perfect his lien or enforce his lien. Those issues are addressed by case law, including
Frazee and Skelton, the requirements of which Clark cannot meet.
Further, § 3-205 does not provide a claim for relief against literally anyone who has ever
touched (no matter how briefly) proceeds if that person no longer possesses the proceeds. See
Frazee, l 04 Idaho at 466, 660 P.2d at 931 (concluding no fund exists where "the moneys had
already been paid to the client").) Clark's overly broad reading of the statute ignores this fact
and would result in the "potential for economic coercion by attorneys" that the Frazee Court
sought to avoid. See idat 465,660 P.2d at 930. Under Clark's overreaching interpretation, an
attorney could simply email every person-attorney or not-whom he thought might potentially
come into contact with his clients' recovery-even if only briefly for transmission purposes-to
create a claim for relief for himself against anyone who touched the proceeds. Clark's
interpretation would require total strangers to an attorney's claim for fees to take affirmative
action to protect that attorney's potential interest in his clients' recovery.
With this power, the attorney could obstruct settlement, as Clark attempted to do in this
case by demanding to be a payee on the Anfinson settlement check. (See R. 15.) Including
Clark as a payee would have prevented Spence from negotiating the check, stymied Anfinson' s
settlement, hindered Jones Gledhill's ability to obtain a dismissal and avoid the impending trial
date, and otherwise unnecessarily embroiled Anfinson, its insurer and Jones Gledhill in Clark's
fee dispute-a dispute in which they have no stake and about which they have no personal
knowledge. This Court should decline to interpret § 3-205 to allow a discharged attorney to
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interfere in this manner with the resolution of the litigation in which he formerly provided
services under the auspices of enforcing an attorney lien.

C. Jones Gledhill Owed Clark No Duty of Care.
Contrary to Clark's allegations, Jones Gledhill had no legal duty to protect Clark's
attorney lien by including Clark's name as payee on the Anfinson settlement check. (R. 21 at
, 26.) Clark misrepresents that the district court rejected Jones Gledhill's argument that it did
not owe Clark a duty of care. (Appellants' Brief at 15-16 ("The District Court also rejected
Jones Gledhill's arguments in their Motion to Dismiss ... that defendants owed no duty of
reasonable care.").) The district court actually ruled the exact opposite: "[Jones Gledhill] owed

no contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect his interests. It was Clark's duty to protect
his own interests, which he failed to do." (R. 72 (emphasis added).)
The district court's ruling is correct. Jones Gledhill owes Clark no duty of care to protect
his interest in his Clients' settlement. Section 3-205 does not provide for a legal duty on behalf
of anyone, let alone Clark's opponent, to protect his lien interests in his Clients' recovery.
Section 3-205 only provides a means by which Clark may protect his interests in his fees but not
a means by which others must protect that interest. Other than his reliance on § 3-205, Clark
offers no argument or authority to support his assertion that Jones Gledhill owed him a duty to
protect his interest in his Clients' settlement, and no such authority exists. (See R. 31-32 (setting
forth additional argument and authorities Jones Gledhill owed Clark no duty of care).)
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1. The Litigation Privilege Protects Jones Gledhill.

Moreover, any claim against Jones Gledhill is barred by the litigation privilege. 5 "This
privilege is predicated on the long-established principle that the efficient pursuit of justice
requires that attorneys and litigants must be permitted to speak and write freely in the course of
litigation without the fear ofreprisal through a civil suit for defamation or libel." Taylor v.
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,836,243 P.3d 642,652 (2010) (citation omitted). In Taylor, this
Court expanded the privilege to "encompass conduct, as well as statements, which occur during
the course oflitigation.... " Id. at 837, 243 P.3d at 653. It held that "where attorneys are being
sued by the opponent of their client in a current or former lawsuit, and that suit arises out of the
attorneys' legitimate representation of that client pursuant to that litigation, the privilege does
apply." Id. at 839, 243 P.3d at 655.
Once the lone prerequisite is met-"namely, that an attorney is acting within the scope of
his employment"-the litigation privilege is an absolute privilege. Id. at 841,243 P.3d at 657.
"It is presumed that an attorney who is acting or communicating in relation to his representation

of a client is acting on behalf of that client and for that client's interests." Id. "To find otherwise
would invite attorneys to divide their interest between advocating for their client and protecting
themselves from a retributive suit," a result plainly contrary to an attorney's ethical obligations.
Id. (citing I.R.P.C. 1.3(1)).
Similar to Clark's misrepresentation that the district court rejected Jones Gledhill's argument
that it owed Clark no duty of care, Clark misrepresents that the district court "rejected" Jones
Gledhill's argument that it had a litigation privilege. (See Appellants' Brief at 16.) To the
contrary, the district court never reached this issue, perhaps because it concluded there was no
legal duty.
5
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As the Court succinctly ruled:
[W]here an attorney is sued by the current or former adversary of his client, as a
result of actions or communications that the attorney has taken or made in the
course of his representation of his client in the course oflitigation, the action is
presumed to be barred by the litigation privilege. An exception to this general
rule would occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to show that the
attorney has engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the scope of
his representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own interests
and not his client's.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Despain v. Unigard Ins. Co., No. 4:14-CV-184-BLW, 2015 WL
1003640, at* 1 (D. Idaho Mar. 6, 2015) (requiring allegation of conduct such as malicious
prosecution or tortious interference with "personal desire to harm" to avoid privilege).
Per Clark's own allegations, the litigation privilege applies to bar his action against Jones
Gledhill. Clark expressly alleges that Jones Gledhill is a law firm and Graham and Fuhrman are
attorneys; that they represented Anfinson in the underlying action at all relevant times; and that
they conveyed a check from Anfinson to Spence in their capacity as legal counsel for Anfinson
per a settlement agreement between the parties. (See R. 17 at 112-5; R. 20 at 1121, 23.)
Notably, Clark does not-and cannot credibly-allege any independent act by Jones Gledhill
outside the scope of its representation that indicates it was acting solely for its own interest and
not in Anfinson's interests. Absent allegations of such conduct, the litigation privilege bars
Clark's action. Although the district coUt-t never had to reach this issue, the privilege is an
alternative basis upon which to affirm the district court's dismissal of Clark's complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 454-55, 65 P.3d 192, 195-96 (2003) (noting
Court "may uphold decisions on alternate grounds").
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II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Clark's Motion to
Amend.
The district court denied Clark's motion to amend his complaint to add new defendants,
including Anfinson and its insurer, and to assert several new allegations. (See R. 74-76 (order
denying motion to amend); R. 308-17 (proposed amendments).) Although Clark does not
identify the district court's denial of his motion to amend as an issue on appeal, he expressly
states that it erred by denying his motion to amend. (See Appellants' Brief at 4, 11 ("The District
Court also erred when it denied Clark's Motion to Amend.").) Clark fails to make any direct
argument or cite any authority challenging the district court's denial, but out of an abundance of
caution, Jones Gledhill addresses the district court's denial, which was proper.

A. Standard of Review
The denial of a plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 43, 122 P.3d 300, 302 (2005).
In reviewing an exercise of discretion, the Court must consider: "(l) whether the court correctly
perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id.
(quotations omitted). The denial of a motion to amend is appropriate if the proposed claim is
futile. Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875,882,303 P.3d 234,241 (2013).
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B. Clark's Proposed Amendments Are Futile.
Clark's proposed amendments are futile. Notably, Clark did not attempt to assert a new
or different claim for relief. Rather, he proposed (1) additional allegations in support of his
original claim, (R. 313 at ,r,r 26-32); and (2) the inclusion of additional defendants, including
Anfinson and "John Doe Insurance Companies"-presumably Anfinson's insurer. (R. 308-10.)
Regarding the proposed defendants, the district court ruled that "[t]o the extent that Plaintiffs
seek to add new Defendants to this case, those new Defendant[s] would have no liability to
Plaintiffs for the same reason that the existing Defendants have no liability." (R. 75.) This ruling
is correct, and Clark does not challenge it on appeal.
Regarding Clark's new allegations in support of his original claim, the district court
"reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, the Proposed Amended Complaint, Memoranda, and
Declaration" and concluded that "[t]hese filings do not add any new facts or authorities that bear
on the correctness of the judgment of the court." (Id) Clark appears to challenge this ruling
arguing that "the District Court's ruling ignores the fact that Jones Gledhill directly interfered
with Clark's ability to 'perfect' his lien.... Clark sought leave to amend his complaint to very
specifically plead that Jones Gledhill had interfered with Clark's ability to perfect his lien."
(Appellants' Brief at 11 (emphasis added).)
Clark's proposed allegations, however, belie this argument. Contrary to Clark's
assertion, he never even uses the words "interfere" or "interference" in his proposed allegations.
(See R. 313 at ,r,r 26-32.) Further, he never argued in support of his motion to amend that he was

attempting to specifically plead Jones Gledhill interfered or otherwise prevented him from
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perfecting his lien. (See R. 322-23.) Rather, Clark argues for the first time on appeal that he
alleged "interference" by Jones Gledhill. Because Clark failed to raise this argument below, the
Court should reject it. Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509,512, 181 P.3d 435,438 (2007)
("'The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the
first time on appeal."'). Moreover, to the extent Clark is attempting to assert a negligence claim
for tortious interference, his proposed allegations fail to state any of the requisite elements of
such a claim. See Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1027, 772 P.2d 228,234 (Ct. App. 1988)
(identifying elements of tortious interference).
Rather than "specifically" pleading interference, Clark's proposed allegations appear to
be an effort allege the Skelton requirements, which he originally failed to allege. His efforts,
however, fail. Despite his new allegations, Clark still cannot meet the elements of Skelton. Most
obviously, that he sued his Clients before suing Jones Gledhill establish he was not "look[ing] to
the fund rather than the client for his compensation." See Skelton, 102 Idaho at 76, 625 P.2d at
1079. (R. 313 at ,r 27 (proposing allegation that he sued his Clients first).) Also, Clark's
allegation that his lien is limited to his earned fees is contradicted by his allegation that he is
seeking fees against Jones Gledhill both for pursuing Clark and for general damages of "at least
$500,000," which greatly exceeds any amount that Clark would be entitled under the terms of his
fee agreements. See id (requiring lien limited to amount incurred in underlying litigation). (See
R. 314 at ,r,r 39-40 (damage allegations); see also infra at pp.19-20 (discussing Clark's fee
agreements).) Because Clark's newly proposed allegations still do not state a viable claim and
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because Clark raises arguments not raised below, this Court should affirm the district court's
denial of Clark's motion to amend.

III. The Fee Award Under§ 12-121 Was Not an Abuse of Discretion.
Clark pursued this case frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. He
disregarded established law; he did not argue any new or novel interpretation of§ 3-205; he did
not argue the law should be extended or modified; and he was specifically warned by Jones
Gledhill before filing his action that existing case law precluded his claim. Furthermore, Clark
unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation by filing extraneous information in the record
unrelated to Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and by repeatedly disclosing confidential
information in the record. For these reasons, the district court properly awarded Jones Gledhill
fees under Idaho Code § 12-121.

A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews an award of attorney fees under § 12-121 at the trial level, applying a
three-part test. Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402,409, 34 P.3d 1085, 1092 (2001). The

. . .
mqmry 1s:
(1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to do it; and
(3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Id.
B. Clark's Action Is Frivolous, Unreasonable and Without Foundation.
This Court should affirm the district court's award of $26,250 in attorney fees to Jones
Gledhill under§ 12-121. Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that attorney
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fees under§ 12-121 may be awarded if the court finds that "the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which finding must be in writing and
include the basis and reasons for the award." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(2). In support of its fee
award, the district court ruled that "Defendants are the prevailing parties in this case, which is
undisputed by Plaintiffs." (R. 207; see also R. 100 (conceding Jones Gledhill is prevailing
party).)
Regarding the frivolous, unreasonable and foundationless nature of the case, the district
court further concluded:
Plaintiffs disregarded established case law finding that the failure to take
affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect an attorney's lien renders the claim
unenforceable. . . . Plaintiffs did not argue a new or novel interpretation of Idaho
Code § 3-205, nor argue that the law should be extended or modified. Plaintiff's
[sic] "novel legal question" merely argued that the Court should ignore
established precedent, which it has declined to do.
Moreover, in correspondence before the suit was filed, Plaintiffs were specifically
warned by Defendants that the claim failed based on Idaho case law.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' [sic] took action that increased the cost of litigation by
filing [confidential] documents [which] did not add anything to Plaintiffs' case
anyhow .
. . . . [T]here was no legal basis for Plaintiffs' claim, of which Plaintiffs' [sic]
were fully aware before filing suit, and then Plaintiffs also unnecessarily
increased the cost of litigation.
Therefore, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs brought and pursued this
case frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation ....
(R. 212-13 (footnote citations to record omitted).)
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In support of its award, the district court also cited Idaho Military Historical Soc y, Inc.
v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,329 P.3d 1072 (2014). (R. 211.) In that case, Maslen had possession
of a historical "Fairchild" airplane owned by the Idaho Military Historical Society ("IMHS"). Id.
at 626,329 P.3d at 1074. Maslen volunteered to store the plane in his hangar space and never
indicated he expected payment. Id at 627, 329 P.3d at 1075. Later, Maslen refused to surrender
the plane to the IMHS and filed a claim of lien with the FAA seeking comperrsatiorrfor expensesincurred while storing the plane. Id. at 626, 329 P.3d at 1074. After a bench trial, the court
found Maslen's "claim oflien was with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the charges
therein" and ordered Maslen to surrender the plane to IMHS. Id. at 629, 329 P.3d at 1077.
Further, the court awarded IMHS fees under§ 12-121 and Rule 54. Id
Maslen challenged the fee award on appeal, but the Court affirmed. It noted that
Maslen's "claim oflien was without foundation, because there was no evidence that [he] was
entitled to compensation." Id. at 631,329 P.3d at 1079. It also noted that "[t]he record in this
case is clear that litigation to obtain possession of the aircraft should never have been necessary.
The litigation was necessitated by factual claims that were indefensible." Id. at 632, 329 P.3d at
1080.
As in Maslen, Clark's litigation to recover his fees against his opponent, Jones Gledhill,
should have never happened. Indeed, Clark eventually conceded that his lien was not
enforceable against Jones Gledhill because he had not perfected his lien. Clark made this
concession in support of his motion to amend, which he filed after oral argument but before the
district court entered its Memorandum Decision. Specifically, Clark concedes "the lien is not
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enforceable or collectable until such time [as] it is ultimately reduced to judgment, because the
actual damages are not yet determined." (R. 320.) Further, Clark concedes he has no idea what
the judgment amount will be but that he is attempting to determine that amount in his separate

Clark action. (R. 321-22.)
Clark cites to these concessions and argues that he was in "good faith" because his claim
against Jones Gledhill "was not yet ripe." (Appellants' Brief at 16.) Apparently, Clark's
assertion is that he could eventually enforce his lien against Jones Gledhill after adjudicating the
amount of the lien against his Clients and Spence. Clark's claim, however, will never be ripe
against Jones Gledhill because Jones Gledhill does not now and will never possess the Clients'
settlement proceeds, as Clark's allegations conceded, and this district court correctly noted.
(R. 20 at ,r 21; R 72.) Accordingly, Clark's claim of"good faith" is hollow.
Clark's argument that he presented a "novel legal issue" is also meritless. (See
Appellants' Brief at 15.) Clark contends his "novel" issue is Jones Gledhill's purported
"interference" with his ability to perfect his lien. (Id.) As discussed above, however, this issue
was never alleged or raised below and, regardless, Clark still fails to state a valid claim. (See

infra at pp. 26-27.) Moreover, it is not "novel" to request that the court simply "ignore
established precedent," as the district court noted. (R. 212.)
Finally, contrary to Clark's argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
referring to Clark's filing of confidential records in support of its fee award. 6 (Appellants' Brief

6 Notably,

Jones Gledhill did not seek fees associated with sealing the records. (See R. 148-53
(identifying billing entries but excluding any for motion to seal).) Rather, the Clients specially
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at 16-17.) The court clearly understood the nature of Clark's wrongful disclosures in both this
case and Clark. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court noted that Clark had filed the
same confidential records in Clark but had stipulated to a protective order in that case to rectify
his wrongful disclosures. (R 68.) Clark's agreement with counsel to maintain confidentialityfollowed the very next day by his disclosure of confidential information in the record in this
case-is also explained elsewhere in the record. (See R. 367-68 at ,r,r 4-7 (explaining Clark's
disclosures); R. 139 at pp. 12:1-13:24 (same).) Clark has no valid excuse for his improper
disclosures or for unreasonably increasing the cost of this litigation by making them.
The district court obviously perceived the issue as one of discretion and acted both within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards while exercising
reason. See Anderson, 136 Idaho at 409, 34 P.3d at 1092 (2001). It carefully reviewed the
filings in support of Jones Gledhill's fee request, made specific findings and conclusions, and
awarded Jones Gledhill the amount it concluded was reasonable. This Court should affirm that
award.
IV. The District Court Properly Sealed the Clients' Confidential Records.

At the outset, Jones Gledhill notes that the district court's decision to seal records has
absolutely no bearing on the merits of this appeal, including Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss,
Clark's motion to amend or the fee award. Clark does not and cannot argue that the district

appeared under Rule 32 of the Idaho Administrative Rules to request sealing. They, however,
did not file a petition for fees.
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court's decision to seal documents somehow impacted its decisions on the merits, other than to
conclude that Clark had unnecessarily increased the cost of this litigation.
Further, Clark's former Clients-not Jones Gledhill-requested the documents to be
sealed to protect their attorney-client privilege and work product, which Clark intentionally filed
in the record. Jones Gledhill has no stake in whether these documents are sealed or not. The
Clients, however, continue to assert that the documents the district court sealed should remain
sealed to protect their interests in their underlying case, which remains on-going. See Forbush v.

Sagecrest Multi-Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Supreme Court No. 44053 (filed March 21, 2016).
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the district court's decision to seal records under Rule 32 of the Idaho
Court Administrative Rules for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 503, 272
P.3d 474,475 (2011). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Id.
Furthermore, "[h]armless error is not grounds for reversal." Rogers v. Trim House, 99
Idaho 746,750,588 P.2d 945, 949 (1979). An error is harmless ifit does not affect the
substantial rights of a party. Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002). A
substantial right is one that potentially affects the outcome of the litigation. Rogers, 99 Idaho at
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749, 588 P.2d at 948. Clark has the burden of showing a prejudicial error, but he fails to make
any argument that the district court's sealing of documents somehow adversely affected his
substantial rights. See id.
B. The Disclosure of the Sealed Materials Would Harm the Clients.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when sealing certain documents in the
record. In January 2016, counsel for the Clients sent Clark a letter expressly informing him that
the Clients "have not authorized you, and you are not authorized to disclose-in court filings or
otherwise-any protected information related to your representation of them, including your
communications with The Spence Law Firm, its lawyers, or its personnel." (R. 367 at ,r 4.)
Despite this warning, Clark filed his former Clients' confidential information in the record in
Clark. Thereafter in that case, on May 3, 2016, Clark deposed the Clients. (R. 367-38 at ,r 5.)
During the course of those depositions, the Clients' counsel discussed their concerns about
Clark's disclosures of privileged information in the record and that the Clients did not intend to
waive their attorney-client privilege or other protections. (Id.) At that time, Clark agreed on the
record and in the presence of his former Clients that he would stipulate to a protective order to
allow for the sealing ofrecords. (Id.; see also R. 139 at 11: 14-13:24.)
Despite this agreement-the very next day-on May 4, Clark again filed his Clients'
confidential information in the record in this case. Just as in Clark, the information included
written communications about the underlying action between Clark and Spence, between Spence
and the Clients, and between Clark and the Clients. (R. 236-48.) Additionally, in opposition to
Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Clark included a detailed description of his views on
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Spence's internal handling of the underlying case, including activities entirely unrelated to
Anfinson. (R. at 250-54.)
Because the Clients' underlying action remains on-going, the Clients moved under
Rule 32 to seal the documents containing their protectable information. (R. 353-76.) In response
to the Clients' motion, Clark again filed yet more of the Clients' confidential documents in the
record. (R. 266.)
The district court properly granted the Clients' motion to seal. Per the requirements of
Rule 32(i), the Court entered finding of facts and conclusions oflaw. (R. 69.) Specifically, the
district court found that "[t]he material sought to be sealed relates to sensitive, if not attorneyclient privileged, conversations between co-counsel, and clients, during Clark's representation of
the former clients in the underlying case." (Id) Further, it found that "the materials sought to be
sealed contain facts and statements that could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or
harm to Clark's former clients. The Court therefore concludes that it is reasonable, necessary
and proper to seal the requested material." (Id)
On appeal, Clark challenges the district court's decision to seal documents solely (and
boldly) on the basis that he has previously made the same wrongful disclosures in the Clark case.
Namely, Clark contends that because he disclosed confidential information in the public record
in Clark, that same information should remain in the public record in this case. (See Appellants'
Brief at 18.) Clark's challenge should be rejected for numerous reasons. First-and foremostClark has no authority in any case or context to disclose his former Clients' protectable
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information. To the contrary, Clark has an on-going duty to maintain that information as
confidential, which duty he has intentionally breached repeatedly. See I.R.P.C. l.6(a).
Second, that Clark originally disclosed his Clients' confidential information in Clark does
not excuse his second wrongful disclosure in this case. Although the confidential information
Clark filed in the Clark case remained in the public record on May 4-the day Clark filed it in
this case-the Clients had specifically addressed Clark's duty to maintain their confidentiality
the day before on May 3. Regardless, Clark made the same wrongful disclosures that he made in
Clark in this case-the day after agreeing to maintain confidentiality. Thereafter, Clark refused

to enter into a stipulation for a protective order in Clark, despite his May 3 agreement, thereby
requiring the Clients to file and argue a motion for such an order. (See R. 139 at p. 13, 11. 16-24.)
Third, that certain of Clark's improper disclosures in the Clark case remained unsealed at
the time he filed Appellants' Brief is not a basis to conclude that the district court in this case
abused its discretion by sealing confidential records. Instead of taking action in the Clark case to
seal his improper filings or instead of notifying the Clients that they needed to do so, Clark yet
again improperly disclosed documents in the public record in this appeal when requesting that
this Court take judicial notice of them. (Motion for Judicial Notice (filed December 9, 2016);
see also Order Denying Motion for Judicial Notice (January 13, 2017).)

Perhaps, Clark is attempting to suggest that the Clients are not concerned about
protecting their confidential information. Clark, however, certainly knows his suggestion is
entirely untrue based upon: (1) the correspondence he received from the Clients' counsel before
his flurry of lawsuits, (2) the discussion during depositions about the need to maintain the
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Clients' confidentiality and his agreement-made in their presence-to do so, (3) the Clients'
request that the district court seal their confidential documents in this case, (4) their efforts to
obtain a protective order in Clark after Clark breached his agreement to stipulate to one, and
(5) their opposition to Clark's Motion for Judicial Notice before this Court. Based upon these
events, Clark undisputedly knows his Clients intend to protect their attorney-client privileged
communications and work product, and Clark's disclosure of that information can only be
described as intentional.
Finally, Clark's repeated, intentional disclosures of his former Clients' confidential
information in this case is particularly egregious because Clark is attempting to disclose the
Clients' confidences to their adversary, Jones Gledhill, which has never been privy to the
information. At least in Clark, the disclosures, while improper, are only immediately available
to the parties in the Clark case who were already privy to the information.
While Clark asserts the district court had no "reasoned basis" to seal records in this case,
it is Clark who has exercised a serious abuse of discretion by flagrantly disregarding his duty of
confidentiality. The district court correctly concluded the information sealed was protectable
under Rule 32, and this Court should affirm that decision.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Clark is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121. Rather, Jones
Gledhill is. Recently, this Court in Frantz v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, 161 Idaho
60, 383 P.3d 1230 (2016), articulated when appellate fees under§ 12-121 are appropriate:

34

Section 12-121 allows an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party where the
action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation. Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the
appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has
failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law.
Further, attorney fees on appeal have been awarded under Section 12-121 when
appellants failed to add any new analysis or authority to the issues raised below
that were resolved by a district court's well-reasoned authority.

Id. at 66,383 P.3d at 1236 (quotations and citations omitted). Fees under§ 12-121 have also
been awarded where "[t]here is no basis in fact or law for [the appellant's] claims and [he] was
so instructed by the district court below." Elliott v. Murdock, 161 Idaho 281,289,385 P.3d 459,
467 (2016).
On appeal, Clark has failed to show that the district court failed to apply well-established
law. As the district court noted, Clark "merely argued that the Court should ignore established
precedent." (R. 212.) Having failed to convince the district court to ignore the law, Clark
appealed and is now requesting that this Court ignore it. Further, Clark has failed to add any new
authority or any new analysis in support of his appeal. Finally, Clark's appeal is not well taken
given that he has already conceded below that the district court's ruling was correct. (See R. 320
(acknowledging his "lien is not enforceable or collectable until such time [as] it is ultimately
reduced to judgment, because the actual damages are not yet determined"); R. 321-22
(acknowledging he has "no idea" what amount he is owed).) For these reasons, the Court should
award fees on appeal to Jones Gledhill under § 12-121.
This award should include Jones Gledhill's fees incurred in opposing Clark's motion for
judicial notice, filed on December 9, 2016, which this Court denied on January 13, 2017.
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Clark's motion was not well grounded in existing law or an extension thereof. Most notably,
Clark failed to cite any legal authority in support of his motion, and the two Idaho authorities
providing for judicial notice, Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and Idaho Code§ 9-101,
are entirely inapplicable. (See Respondents' Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Judicial
Notice at pp. 7-9.) Furthermore, Clark undisputedly knows that he should not disclose in the
public record the confidential information he submitted to this Court for judicial notice. Clark's
repeated and inexplicable violations of his duty of confidentiality appear to be interposed for the
improper purpose of increasing the cost of this (and other) litigation and jeopardizing his former
Clients' underlying action. As a result, Clark has violated both the improper purpose clause and
the frivolous filing clause ofldaho Appellate Rule 11.2. See Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,
987, 342 P.3d 907, 914 (2015) (concluding "attorney fees can be awarded as sanctions when a
party or attorney violates either (a) the frivolous filings clause or (b) the improper purpose
clause").

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill respectfully requests that this Court: (1) affirm
the district court's grant of Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion; (2) affirm the district court's
denial of Clark's motion to amend; (3) affirm the district court's award of fees to Jones Gledhill
under§ 12-121; (4) affirm the district court's decision to seal records under Rule 32; (5) deny
Clark's request for fees on appeal; and (6) grant Jones Gledhill's request for fees on appeal,
including fees incurred to oppose to Clark's Motion for Judicial notice.
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DATED THIS 7th day of February 2017.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC

Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
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Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
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